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McCutcheon Money 
The Projected Impact of Striking 
Aggregate Contribution Limits
E Q U A L  C H A N C E  F O R  A L L
A N  E Q U A L  S A Y  A N D  A N
T his term, the Supreme Court is considering a challenge to aggregate contribution limits in a case called McCutcheon v. FEC. 
The current limit on what one person may 
contribute to all federal candidates, parties 
and PACs is $123,200.1 Absent this limit, 
one wealthy donor would be permitted 
to contribute more than $3.5 million to a 
single party’s candidates and party commit-
tees (plus a virtually unlimited amount to 
supportive PACs).2  
Under current case law, the Supreme 
Court should uphold aggregate contribution 
limits as a decades-old protection against 
corruption, the appearance of corruption, 
and circumvention of base contribution 
limits.3  
But the Roberts Court has been willing to 
toss precedent aside to gut campaign finance 
laws in the past. So it’s worth asking, what 
would be the practical effect if the Court 
strikes a federal contribution limit for the 
first time?
“McCutcheon Money”
We project that striking aggregate con-
tribution limits would bring more than $1 
billion in additional campaign contributions 
from elite donors through the 2020 election 
cycle. Elite donors are defined here as those 
who gave (or are projected to give) at, over, 
or within 10% of the aggregate contribution 
limit.
This figure does not represent a sea change 
when compared with existing spending 
levels, and much if it may be funds shifted 
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Figure 1.  Projected "McCutcheon Money": 
Giving by Elite Donors
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from outside spending organizations rather 
than completely new money coming into 
the system.  But, history suggests that candi-
date spending is more effective than outside 
spending4, and the increased direct giving 
would significantly strengthen the power of 
a tiny number of elite donors compared with 
small contributors. Striking aggregate limits 
would increase these elite donors’ influence 
over elected officials by making officehold-
ers increasingly dependent upon this small 
slice of the population for campaign funds.
More Power for Elite Donors
In 2012, just 1,219 elite donors contributed 
$155.2 million to candidates, parties, and 
PACs. Without an aggregate contribution 
limit, we estimate that these donors would 
have contributed $459.3 million in the 2012 
cycle. As a point of reference, this projected 
sum is 47% more than all of the funds that 
President Obama and Governor Romney 
raised combined from at least 4,040,442 
small donors.
The undue and increasing power of large 
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Figure 2.  Elite Donor Power in 2012 Without Aggregate 
Limits
 
donors fuels the public’s 
mistrust of government 
and the widespread 
appearance of corruption 
that aggregate contribu-
tion limits are intended to 
combat.
Government in the 
U.S. is strongly respon-
sive to the public policy 
preferences of those who 
can afford to make large 
campaign contributions, 
and almost completely 
unresponsive to the prior-
ities of the general public.5 
Americans recognize this,6 
and believe it is due to the 
influence of large cam-
paign contributions.7 This 
has fed the widespread 
belief that our government 
is corrupt and contribut-
ed to the lowest levels of 
confidence in Congress on 
record.8 
To view Dēmos’ and 
U.S. PIRG’s amicus brief 
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to the Supreme Court showing how govern-
ment’s responsiveness to large donors fuels 
the appearance of corruption, visit http://
www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/mccutcheon_sc_demos_cwa_amici_
brief.pdf.
Brief Methodology
Our projections are an attempt to esti-
mate the effect of eliminating aggregate con-
tribution limits on the behavior of a set of 
1,219 elite donors who are already over, at, 
or near these limits. Our actual estimates are 
grounded in projections about how many of 
these donors have both the ability and the 
motivation to significantly increase their 
giving and how many would likely do so 
more moderately. In practice, this projection 
falls in between two simpler scenarios—one 
more aggressive and one more conservative. 
If parties aggressively solicit large checks 
we may see donors maxing out both to party 
committees and all competitive House and 
Senate races (aggressive scenario). The more 
conservative scenario has donors maxing 
out only to the candidates and parties they 
already supported in 2012, projecting no ex-
pansion in the number of entities they will 
support. Given the sharp rate of growth in 
campaign spending in recent cycles, howev-
er, there is every reason to expect that savvy 
officeholders, party officials, and donors will 
pursue every available fundraising avenue.
For a detailed explanation of the method-
ology used for these projections, visit http://
www.demos.org/publication/mccutch-
eon-methodology.
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Figure 3.  Aggressive, Conservative, and Projected Scenarios
$2,500,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$1,500,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$500,000,000
$0
2012 2014 2016
Conservative Scenario
Aggresive Scenario
Baseline (with cap)
Projected Giving (without cap)
www.demos.org
220 Fifth Avenue, 2nd Fl.
New York, New York 10001
p: 212.633.1405
media contact
Elektra Gray
egray@demo s.org
p: 212.485.6014
  
Endnotes
1. http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml#Chart This does not 
include Super PACs.
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committees, and each of the party’s 50 state committees.
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on McCutcheon v. FEC, available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.
org/images/McCutcheon_v_FEC_Background_Memo_-_Website_
FINAL__9-26-13.pdf
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2012-elections
5.  See generally, Martin Gilens, Affluence & Influence: Economic 
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8. Elizabeth Mendes & Joy Wilke, Gallup, Americans’ Confidence in Congress 
Falls to Lowest on Record, Gallup Poll (June 13, 2013)
Elizabeth Ridlington and Miles Unterreiner of Frontier 
Group and Robert Hiltonsmith of Dēmos helped with data 
analysis for this report.
